The French Army’s ability to adapt: the example of the Algerian War

A convoy of M8 light armoured cars of the Saharan Motorised Company of Oued R’Hir, in 1956. © Raymond Varoqui/ECPAD/Défense

The cumbersome nature of a NATO army

In November 1954, the troops of General Cherrière, structured and trained according to the NATO model, found themselves at a distinct disadvantage as far as the terrain was concerned, and facing an elusive enemy. Over 20 operations were carried out through the autumn and winter of 1954-55. The main aim of these raids was to give a show of strength, but unfortunately their ineffectiveness earned the General harsh criticism.
All that their heavy hardware could do was hold the country’s few roads, with armoured cars and troop carriers.
 

A road block in the Mascara sector in 1957. The army and gendarmerie are installing chevaux-de-frise defences on a bridge. © Photographer unknown/ECPAD/Défense

Their heavily equipped infantry belonged to metropolitan units that were discovering the guerrilla warfare of the djebel for the first time: mechanised road patrols were ambushed by “outlaws”, who killed a handful of men, then vanished into the wilds.
Meanwhile, troop manoeuvres were too noisy and cumbersome to keep the element of surprise that was crucial to sealing off or policing an area effectively. Some operations employed colossal amounts of military resources (tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery batteries, engineer sections) to recover a few weapons and arrest a handful of suspects.
There were too few surveillance helicopters and aeroplanes. Pilots faced a new kind of terrain and a far more fluid enemy, who, besides, were less fearful of the jet aircraft – too fast for close combat – than the turboprop (T-6 or Piper).

The army adapts to the Algerian War

On his first trip to the Aurès in 1955, Jacques Soustelle was struck by the NATO-type characteristics still displayed by the army after four months of operations.

Similarly, when General Lorillot arrived in June that year, he felt that “the only really effective way to proceed would be to create lighter, mobile units that operated offensively or from concealed positions and moved around at night”.
1956 saw major efforts in all areas. To begin with, troop numbers were increased, rising from 50 000 in 1954 to 400 000 in July-August 1956. This army of large battalions was equipped with rifles with telescopic sights and flashlights.

Next, the metropolitan units were transformed so as to make use of direct and indirect support (armoured vehicles and artillery), as well as modes of transport that were suited to the terrain. Accordingly, each large unit was equipped with a mule company, and three mounted spahi regiments and a cavalry squadron were created within each of the four Groupes de Compagnies Nomades d’Algérie[2], to make up for the return to Morocco of the three Moroccan Tabors that had been serving in Constantine Province. Figures show that there were 2 884 military horses in Algeria in 1960, together with a further 3 500 horses with the auxiliaries.

In the Sahara, where there was no shortage of areas inaccessible to vehicles, “Saharan Infantry Companies” were formed, in which camel platoons served alongside motorised ones.

Touaregs of the 2nd Mounted Platoon of the Tassili Camel Company (CMT) on their dromedaries, at Fort Tarat, in 1956. They are armed with MAS-36 rifles. © Descamps (Algeria)/ECPAD/Défense

The armoured cavalry introduced mixed regiments comprised of three squadrons: one of light tanks (M24s or AMX-13s), one of armoured vehicles (EBRs, M8s and later Ferrets[3]) and one of half-tracks.

In the artillery, groups[4] were equipped with twelve 105mm guns and 700 men who could serve as infantry. The M1897 75mm field gun remained in use, but as a direct-support weapon in the infantry.

The engineers, equipped with American heavy machinery and Leroy compressors, made a significant contribution in terms of road-building, and the aviation engineers in terms of airfield repairs and construction. 

The navy also adapted to fulfil its role of maritime surveillance and combat arms trafficking. Its force used a combination of surveillance aircraft equipped with radar, the submarine Artémis (with its cutting-edge wiretapping technology) and small, often dilapidated fishing boats, called lamparos, which were requisitioned to patrol the coastline.

Meanwhile, the air force became omnipresent, with its B-26s for bombing missions, Pipers for surveillance, T-6s for ground support (the T-6 was an obsolete, superseded trainer aircraft, but it was ideal for air-ground support in counter-insurgency operations, because it flew more slowly than jet aircraft) and, last of all, transport from aeroplanes and helicopters that were seeing active service for the first time in Algeria and enjoyed growing success over the course of the conflict.

Aerial view of two T-6 fighter planes flying over Rebahia (former name: Nazereg-Flinois), 1959. © ECPAD/Smet archive/Arthur Smet

Massive use of “auxiliaries”

Given that the “rebels” had perfect knowledge of the terrain and blended in with the locals, the French Army soon resorted to auxiliaries to identify and isolate them. Armed with a motley assortment of rudimentary weapons (hunting rifles, Lebel and Berthier 92/16 rifles from the First World War, American rifles from the Second), they produced very satisfactory results. From April 1956, the harkis appeared in the regiments, the Self-Defence Groups (GADs) and the maghzens of the Specialised Administrative Sections (SASs). This system meant that, by 1960, the army had a force of approximately 200 000 men, in addition to the territorial units mobilised in 1956, equipped with Lebel rifles[1]. Finally, the use of shepherds as “trackers”, to “search systematically for traces”, made the “rebels” into game. This method produced very good results.
 

Newly recruited harkis train in La Cherrata, Constantine Province, February 1960. © ECPAD/Klerzkowski

Military operations become more effective

From a tactical point of view, after submitting to the enemy in the early days of the conflict, the army now raised its game, laying roadblocks at the borders and launching the Challe Plan. Operations increased in scale, both in terms of the size of the areas being policed and the troop numbers involved. The general reserve units were tasked with dismantling the wilayas. Until then, the term “general reserve” had meant units equipped with heavy weaponry, but during the course of the Algerian War, it came to mean lightly equipped units. Their actions were followed up by those of the Commandos de Chasse, special counter-insurgency units that sought contact intelligence. The sector units were tasked with preventing the enemy from re-establishing themselves, by occupying the terrain and recruiting locally. By early 1960, the results were satisfactory and a large number of ALN members had chosen to side with the French.

To combat urban terrorism in Algiers, General Massu, at the head of the 4 600-strong 10th Parachute Division, was given the civilian and military powers to wage a kind of warfare hitherto unknown to the army.

The remilitarisation of the administration was marked above all by the creation of the Special Administrative Sections (SASs), whose main aim was to form a protective network around rural communities previously cut off from the authorities, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the FLN, by providing them with administrative support, schools and health care.

Army command in Algiers gained a “fifth bureau”, which proved highly effective in combating the OPA’s propaganda activities.

New means of warfare 

The French Army concentrated its efforts on what the Americans term “AirLand Battle” doctrine[5].

At the beginning of the conflict, the Army’s light aviation force, ALAT, had only the 3rd Artillery Observation Group (GOA 3) on the ground, based at Sétif. On 29 April 1955, the 2nd Helicopter Group (GH 2) was created[6], stationed at Aïn Arnat, in Sétif Province. GH 2 saw its apex in 1958[7], with 130 machines: 10 aeroplanes and 120 helicopters. In July 1956, the naval air force created the 31st Flotilla, which was attached to GH 2 the following month. The group served in the Pierres Précieuses (“Precious Stones”) operations from September 1959 to April 1960, proving just how effective helicopters could be on this type of mission.
 

GH 2 (2nd Helicopter Group) at the Aïn Arnat base in 1956. A soldier checks the fuel level of a Bell 47G helicopter. © Noël/ECPAD/Défense

On 1 April 1955, the French Air Force created the 57th Helicopter Escadrille, equipped with Bell 47s and later Sikorsky S-55s. In June 1956, the first Vertol H-21s, better known as “Flying Bananas”, arrived.

The arrival of these new machines brought a tactical development that was perfectly in keeping with the Challe Plan, put into practice by paratroopers and their officers. The H-21’s troop-carrying capacity meant that men in camouflaged combat fatigues, which contrasted with the older uniforms still being worn at the time, could engage with the enemy without first having to undertake climbs or forced marches.
In the sphere of ground support, from 1959 onwards, helicopters equipped with 20mm MG 151 cannons[8] became indispensable to the Helicopter Response Detachments (DIH[9]) brought into service in 1957, to complement the actions of the T-6s, which had to fly higher and move away between raids now that the ALN were equipped with MG 42s. Towards the end of the conflict, Alouettes equipped with SS 11 anti-tank missiles were used, to fight the “rebels” sheltering in caves.

Finally, with the arrival of the Alouette II came “flying command posts”, due to the considerable advances being made in transmissions at the time.
The two main problems facing transmitters were the technical issue of covering a vast territory without the use of wires vulnerable to sabotage, and the tactical issue of units being split for decentralised operations. The many areas of high ground enabled a complex of radio networks to be put in place, followed by a complete terrestrial network that was more reliable than any before it, thereby resolving the first issue. To resolve the second, the small autonomous units were given very powerful radio receivers, which they carried on the backs of mules.

But the most remarkable feat of military technology was the Pédron and Morice Lines, despite the fact that the idea behind them was an old one[10]. The Morice Line, which became operational in September 1957, was not designed to be an insurmountable obstacle, but rather a filter that detected people crossing it and alerted the sector units or general reserve so that they could intervene. Stretching 280 km at a distance of 20 to 30 km from the Tunisian border, it consisted of a core comprising a 2.5 metre-high fence fitted with an electronic device that notified, in real time, the precise points where it had been cut or merely lifted. On either side, improvements were made during the Battle of the Frontiers: mobile troops patrolling inside the barrier, state-of-the-art mines laid along the edges, use of sniffer dogs, installation of modern weapon-tracking radar and, for the first time on a battlefield, the use of active infrared night-vision devices and weaponry. In the south, where a border fence had yet to be erected, a combined radar and fire-control system was put in place. Between January and May 1958, the Battle of the Frontiers raged, reaching its height in April in the Soukh-Ahras sector. The results[11] show just how effective the French system was.

Thus, the army adapted to the new conflict through a combination of policing the local population on the ground and large-scale operations using the latest technological resources.

From the 1960s onwards, however, priority was given to developing France’s nuclear weapons capability. French defence policy became integrated with that of Western Europe, with nuclear deterrence as the cornerstone of its doctrine. The Algerian army therefore made way for a more modern army, which nevertheless benefited from the technological and tactical experience acquired during the Algerian War.

This text is a revised version of an article published in the quarterly review Le Casoar in 1999.

Colonel Thierry Noulens

Departmental military commander for Calvados

PhD in history